Nuclear weapons proliferation is at the top of the news these days. Most recent reports have focused on the nuclear efforts of Iran and North Korea, but they also typically warn that those two acute diplomatic headaches may merely be the harbingers of a much darker future. Indeed, foreign policy sages often claim that what worries them most is not the small arsenals that Tehran and Pyongyang could build for themselves, but rather the potential that their reckless behavior could catalyze (...) a process of runaway nuclear proliferation, international disorder, and, ultimately, nuclear war. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jacques Derrida INTERPRETING SIGNATURES (NIETZSCHE/HEIDEGGER): TWO QUESTIONS T1HE first question concerns die name Nietzsche, die second has to do with the concept of totality. Let us begin widi chapters 2 and 3 of Heidegger's Nietzsche — dealing with "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same" and "The Will to Power as Knowledge," respectively. We will be turning especially to the subsection on chaos ["The Concept of Chaos," I, pp. (...) 562-70] and to "The Alleged Biologism of Nietzsche" ["Nietzsches angeblicher Biologismus"]. In view ofme fact mat the same interpretation is regularly at work throughout, the risks involved in choosing diis strategy are, I hope, quite limited. In each instance, a single system of reading is powerfully concentrated and gadiered together. It is directed at gadiering togedier the unity and the uniqueness of Nietzsche's diinking, which, as a fulfilled unity, is itself in a fair way to being the culmination of occidental metaphysics. Nietzsche would be precisely at the crest, or ridge, atop the peak of diis fulfillment. And thus he would be looking at both sides, down both slopes. What about diis unity — diis doubled unity? What is its connection to the name — or rather, the signature — of Nietzsche? Does Heidegger take any account of this question — which others might call biographical, autobiographical, or autographical — of the singularity of a signature ostensibly the proper name of Nietzsche? To put the matter anodier way, if one can glimpse behind Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche the foundations of a general reading of Western metaphysics, men die question Translated by Diane Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer. 246 Jacques Derrida247 arises: To what extent does this interpretation of metaphysics in its totality and as a whole contain an interpretive decision about die unity or singularity of thinking? And to what extent does this interpretive decision also presuppose a decision about die "biographical," about the proper name, the autobiographical, and about signature — about the politics of signature? ' Heidegger's position on this subject I will indicate first ofall widi a summarizing and simplifying statement, which one could, I hope, demonstrate is not wrong: there is a unity in Nietzschean thought even if it is not that of a system in the classical sense. This unity is also its uniqueness, its singularity. A thesis explicidy advanced by Heidegger is that every great thinker has only one thought. This uniqueness was neither constituted nor threatened, neither gadiered together nor brought about, through a name or proper name — nor by the life of Nietzsche, either normal or insane. This unique unity is something it draws from the unity of Western metaphysics which is gathered together mere at its crest, which one could also compare to the simple unity of a line created by a fold. The result of all this is that biography, autobiography, the scene or the powers of the proper name, of proper names, signatures, and so on, are again accorded minority status, are again given the inessential place diey have always occupied in the history ofmetaphysics. This points to the necessity and place of a questioning which I can only sketch here. Such would be a simplified version of the question. Now let us read Heidegger a little more closely and seek to confirm the strongest coherence of his interpretation or, beyond its coherence, his deepest thought. As a provisional concession to die classical norms of reading, let us take this book at its beginning, or even before its beginning at the beginning ofthe preface. Naturally, diis preface was, like so many odiers, written later. As we know, the book goes back to a series of lectures given between 1936 and 1940, and to some treatises written between 1940 and 1946. One should take most careful note of these dates if one is to bring this interpretation, as a whole and in detail, into connection with the historicopolitical and institutional field of its presentation. The preface, however, dates from 1961. The intention of the two pages in mis case, as almost always, is to justify the publication of this collection by reference to the essential unity ofits totality: "This publication, rethought (nachgedacht) as a whole (als Ganzes) should provide a glimpse ofthe path ofthought... (shrink)

L'auteur de cet essai tente de circonscrire l'aventure philosophique de la "quête de la vérité", en s'inspirant des recherches les plus récentes de l'épistémologie et de la logique, essayant de trouver dans la praxis des pierres d'achoppement pour un discours au moins tendanciellement vrai. Dans la confusion politique et culturelle de ce siècle, des vérités multiples prétendent avoir droit à l'expression. On parle d'intelligence digitalisée et artificielle, de désinformation, d'infox, d'intox, de propagande, de mensonges, de vérités alternatives. Ça caquète et (...) ça rugit de toutes parts, voulant soutenir la véracité par la force ou la répétition. Surtout dans ce qui se vante comme l'extrême conquête de notre civilisation occidentale, la démocratie, les harangues et les verbiages sont souvent vides de contenus, des baudruches regorgeant de promesses vaines et de captations factices. De gros intérêts financiers ou des déformations idéologiques se cachent derrière un discours qui se prétend précis et neutre. Il n'est pas étonnant de voir maint citoyen perdu dans cette cacophonie ambiante, de le voir découragé devant son manque d'information fiable et d'action cohérente. Pourtant les choses qu'il vit et qu'il sent sont dures et réelles. Elles ont des angles qui parfois font mal. La vérité existe... quelque part et de quelque façon."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Neste artigo, trata-se, por um lado, de compreender até que ponto a existência humana e o pensamento, naquilo que eles têm de inventivo, são feitos de sínteses disjuntivas. E qual tipo de repetição entre os elementos, ligados de maneira nãocasual, mas não sistemática, supõe esta síntese tão importante no pensamento de Gilles Deleuze. Por outro lado, trata-se de saber se esse conceito de repetição converge com aquele que reclama a psicanálise.

This article examines ways in which research conducted under the Human Microbiome Project, an effort to establish a “reference catalogue” of the micro-organisms present in the human body and determine how changes in those micro-organisms affect health and disease, raise challenging issues for regulation of human subject research. The article focuses on issues related to subject selection and recruitment, group stigma, and informational risks, and explores whether: (1) the Common Rule or proposed changes to the Rule adequately address these issues (...) and (2) the Common Rule is the most appropriate vehicle to provide regulatory oversight and guidance on these topics. (shrink)

The proposed changes to the Common Rule, described in the recent Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, come more than 20 years after the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services adopted the Rule in 1991. Since that time, human subjects research has changed in significant ways. Not only has the volume of clinical research grown dramatically, this research is now regularly conducted at multiple collaborative sites that are often outside of the United States. Research takes place not only in academic (...) medical centers, but also at outpatient clinics, community hospitals, and other nontraditional venues. In addition, technological advances, such as sophisticated computer software programs, the Internet, social media, new research methods, and mobile applications have exponentially increased the volume of data available and the possibilities for accessing, analyzing, and sharing that data. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the Ganser syndrome and gives a brief account on its clinical features. A significant number of clinicians in Europe continued accepting Ganser's basic postulates that the patients showed significant memory disorder and 'answers towards the question' within the framework of traumatic or reactive hysteria. In elderly patients, Ganser type symptoms may be indicative of the onset of dementia. Ganser syndrome raises the question of the interaction between concepts, ideology and clinical observation. The clinician must be aware that (...) a misdiagnosed case of Ganser-type hysteria may result in lawsuits, unnecessary surgical interventions, inappropriate use of minor and major tranquillizers, and social consequences that may be destabilizing for the patient and family. Positive results in the organic investigation should lead to a firm diagnosis and disconfirmation of Ganser syndrome. Persistent negative results and dramatic improvement should tend to confirm the diagnosis. (shrink)

Un ensemble de textes qui ont comme sujet soit Jacques Proust lui-même, spécialiste du siècle des lumières et de Diderot en particulier, soit un domaine que ce professeur universitaire de lettres affectionnait, tel le Japon.

This paper considers Freud's 1920 text, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in light of Jacques Derrida's critical commentary on it in The Post Card. Against the deconstructive reading that highlights the performative aspects of Freud's speculative remarks, David-Ménard reads Freud's theory of the death drive as an epistemological and experimental hypothesis necessary for giving an account of the complexity and diversity of the clinical phenomenon of repetition in psychoanalysis. Though the death drive never appears locatable as such in the various (...) examples given by Freud, it is nonetheless accessible in the constellation of differences produced by traumatic dreams, children's games, etc. (shrink)

In Archive Fever , Jacques Derrida deftly guides us through an extended meditation on remembrance, religion, time, and technology--fruitfully occasioned by a deconstructive analysis of the notion of archiving. Intrigued by the evocative relationship between technologies of inscription and psychic processes, Derrida offers for the first time a major statement on the pervasive impact of electronic media, particularly e-mail, which threaten to transform the entire public and private space of humanity. Plying this rich material with characteristic virtuosity, Derrida constructs (...) a synergistic reading of archives and archiving, both provocative and compelling. "Judaic mythos, Freudian psychoanalysis, and e-mail all get fused into another staggeringly dense, brilliant slab of scholarship and suggestion."-- The Guardian "[Derrida] convincingly argues that, although the archive is a public entity, it nevertheless is the repository of the private and personal, including even intimate details."-- Choice "Beautifully written and clear."--Jeremy Barris, Philosophy in Review "Translator Prenowitz has managed valiantly to bring into English a difficult but inspiring text that relies on Greek, German, and their translations into French."-- Library Journal. (shrink)

The paper deals with the contributions of Jacques Herbrand to logic and philosophy in historical context.

Le présent ouvrage est une lecture généalogique des versions successives de l'interrogation que Heidegger consacra à l'origine de l'œuvre d'art à l'époque de sa compromission la plus manifeste avec le nazisme. Comme cette compromission se déclarait justifiée non par l'idéologie officielle mais par des arguments strictement philosophiques, elle invite à s'enquérir des sources qu'avait pareille justification d'une part dans les travaux antérieurs du philosophe, notamment dans Sein und Zeit, et d'autre part dans la mémoire qu'il avait, immense mais très sélective, (...) de l'histoire de la philosophie depuis les Grecs jusqu'à Nietzsche. Jacques Taminiaux met en contraste deux approches philosophiques de l'art et du politique : l'approche spéculative, celle de Platon chez les Anciens et de Hegel chez les Modernes, et l'approche judicative, celle d'Aristote chez les Anciens et de Kant chez les Modernes. La première approche, célébrée par Heidegger, réserve au philosophe le privilège d'une vue de dernière instance sur l'art et le politique. L'approche judicative, en revanche, dédaignée par le penseur allemand, reconnaît à chacun le droit et la capacité de se prononcer dans ces deux domaines. (shrink)